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THE REAL ESTATE BROKER AND HIS
COMMISSIONS.
By FLOYD R. MECHEm.'l
NATURE OF HIS UNDERTAKING.-In dealing with
SECTION I.
the question of the right of a real estate broker to commissions for
selling or buying land, and the conditions under which they become
payable, it is essential at the outset to get a clear conception of the
nature of his undertaking as he is ordinarily employed. A broker
employed to sell real estate may be authorized and required by the
terms of his undertaking, not only to find a purchaser, but even to
conclude an actual transfer, or at least to procure from the purchaser a valid written agreement binding him to purchase upon the
terms specified; and where this is his undertaking the broker has
not earned his commission until he has performed it or the principal
has accepted a less complete performance.:,

i. Professor of Law in the University of Chicago.
132. Thus in Rutenberg v. Main, 47 Cal. 213 [distinguishing Duffy v.

Hobson (40 Cal. 243), cited in a later note and distinguished in Armstrong r.
Lowe (76 Cal. 616, i8 Pac. 758), also cited in a following note], it was held
that the broker was clearly relied upon to complete a binding contract. It
was manifest from the evidence, said the court, that it was the intention that
the agent "should do more than discharge the functioni of a broker."
See, also, Hyams v. Miller, 71 Ga. 6o8; Parker v. Walker, 86 Tenn. 566,
8 S. W. 391; Gilchrist v. Clarke, 86 Tenn. 583, 8 S. W. 572; Wiggins V.
Compare, also, Kerfoot v. Steele, 113 Ill.
Wilson, 55 Fla. 346, 45 So. Iol.
61o (a broker to purchase property).
In Pfanz v. Humburg, 82 Ohio St. I, 91 N. E. 863, the court recognized
the general rule that a broker who-has secured a purchaser ready, willing
and able to buy has earned his commission, but held that under a written
contract of employment to "pay for services when the property is sold," the
broker earned no commission unless he secured a written contract binding
the purchaser to buy.
In Barber v. Miller, 41 Pa. Super. Ct. 442, the court, in reversing a judgment of the county court, said that good defense had been made if defense
showed that contract of employment of plaintiff agent was that he should
secure a lessee to sign the lease and to make a down payment thereon, that
the plaintiff did secure an acceptable offer from people with whom defendant
had been negotiating before he employed plaintiff, but that plaintiff failed
and could not secure the tenant's signature to the lease, nor any down pay-
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SEC. 2. But the authority and duty of the real estate broker,
as ordinarily employed, do not go so far. He has usually very few
of the characteristics of an ordinary agent, but stands rather in the
attitude of one to whom the offer of a unilateral contract has been
made. That is to say, the owner offers to pay a commission if the
broker will perform a certain act, namely, to find a purchaser for
the property upon certain terms. The broker, on the other hand,
ordinarily makes no present promise. He does not agree that he
will find a purchaser. He may, however, accept the owner's offer,
and thus change it into a binding contract, by the performance of the
act stipulated.
SEC. 3. USUALLY NEED NoT CONCLUDE A BINDING SALEFIND PURCHASER READY, WILLING AND ABLE TO Bu.-Inasmuch
as the broker in the ordinary case is employed without writing, and
inasmuch as in several states an agent for the sale of land must be
authorized by writing, the broker, as ordinarily employed, in such
states would not be properly authorized to make a binding contract
of sale.2 A fortiori,he would not be authorized to execute a deed of
conveyance. 8 Moreover, even if no question of written authority
were involved, it is doubtless true that the general employment of
an ordinary broker to "sell" land does not contemplate that he is to
close the bargain; and, unless something more is expressly stipulated for, the broker will have neither the authority nor the dutyto

ment, and that such signature and payment were secured only after subsequent independent efforts of other-brokers.
In Chaffee v. Widman, Colo. , 1o8 Pac. 996, the plaintiff had
been employed by defendant, who agreed to pay commission if plaintiff
"procure a purchaser who shall on or before March I, i9o4, pay or secure
to parties of first part (defendants) the sum of $I6,ooo." Before March I
the plaintiff obtained a man with whom the defendants entered into contract
binding that man as purchaser for $i6,ooo to pay some cash and to give
security for rest on or before March I, I9O4. But inasmuch as the payment
was not made and the security was not given and the contract was abandoned
by the parties to it, the plaintiff was held not to have earned his commission.
In Beale v,. Bond, 84 Law T. 313, a broker to sell two leaseholds was

told that the principal wanted £1,I5O net, and that he might have whatever
over that amount he could get, and the court thought that the contract was
special by which the broker was entitled to no commission until the money
was actually paid. The customer, with whom the principal made a good
contract, refused to perform and the broker was allowed no commissions.
2. Lawson v. King, 56 Wash. 15, 104 Pac. 1118; Shillinglaw v. Sims, 86
S. Car. 76, 67 S. E. 906. Cases going upon the ground that written authority was essential: Ballou v. Bergvendsen, 9 N. Dak. 285, 83 N. W. IO; Halsell v. Renfrow, 14 Okla. 674, 78 Pac. 118; Purkey v. Harding, 23 S. Dak. 69,
123 N. W. 69.
3.

White v. Lee, -

Miss. -

, 52 So. 2o6.
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complete a binding contract between the purchaser and the seller.'
His duty is ordinarily performed when he has found a purchaser
who is ready, willing and able to purchase upon the terms specified,'
4. Duffy v. Hobson, 40 Cal. 24o, 6 Am. Rep. 617, is one of the leading
cases upon the subject. It was agreed that written authority was not necessary, and the case turned upon the proper construction of an authority to a
broker to sell. The court said that a sale of land involved so many questions concerning which the seller presumptively would wish to decide for
himself-such as the adjustment of the terms, the kind and form of the
conveyance, the state of the title, the surrender of possession, the personality
of the purchaser, and the like-that "a mere authority 'to sell' can hardly
confer power upon the agent to determine all these matters for his principal,
so as to bind him by his determination." "To give to the mere words 'to
sell' such a broad signification as that would be to invest the agent with
powers of that ample and discretionary character usually only conferred with
caution and by means of a general letter of attorney where the terms are
distinctly expressed." Followed in Armstrong v. Lowe, 76 Cal.-616, 18 Pac.
758 (distinguishing Rutenberg v. Main, 47 Cal. 219, cited in a preceding
note); Bacon v. Davis, 9 Cal. App. 83, 98 Pac. 71.
Duffy v. Hobson is expressly approved and followed in Ryon v. McGee,
2 Mack. (D. C.) 17; Mannix v. Hildreth, 2 App. Cas. D. C. 259; Jones v.
Halloday, 2 App. Cas. D. C. 279; Carstens v. McReavy, i Wash. 359, 25 Pac.
471 (followed in Barnes v. German Say. Society, 21 Wash. 448, 58 Pac. 569;
Armstrong v. Oakley, 23 Wash. 122, 62 Pac. 499) ; McCullough v. Hitchcock,
71 Conn. 401, 42 At. 81 (a written request to a broker to find a purchaser
does not confer upon him implied power to sign a contract of sale binding
upon his principal); Campbell v. Galloway, 148 Ind. 440, 47 N. E. 818 (same);
Donnan v. Adams, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 615, 71 S. W. 580; Halsey v. Monteira,
92 Va. 58r, 24 S. E. 258; Ballon v. Bergvendsen, 9 N. Dak. 285, 83 N. W. io
(though here written authority was held essential).
To same effect: Buckingham v. Harris, IO Colo. 455, 15 Pac. 817;
Balkema v. Searle, 116 Iowa 374, 89 N. W. 1O87; Chick v. Bridges, Ore.
lo7 Pac. 478.
In Lindley v. Keim, 54 N. T. Eq. 418, 34 At. 1O73, the court affirmed a
declaration of the court below that "The mere employment of an ordinary
real estate broker to effect a sale of a parcel of land, even though the price
and terms be prescribed, does not amount to giving present authority to such
broker to conclude a binding contract for the same. Moreover, such authority is not usually to be inferred from the use by the principal and broker in
that connection of the terms 'for sale' or 'to sell' and the like. Those words
in that connection usually mean no more than to negotiate a sale by finding
a purchaser upon satisfactory terms." See, also, Milne v. Kleb, 44 N. J.Eq.
378; Dickinson v. Updike (N. J.), 49 At. 712.
Contra: Haydock v. Stow, 40 N. Y. 363.
5. (This list does not purport to be complete.)
United States: McGavock v. Woodlief, 20 How. (U. S.) 22r; Watson
v. Brooks, 8 Sawy. (U. S. C. C.) 316; Kock v. Emmerling, 22 How. (U. S.)
6o; Auerbach v. Internationale Geselschaft, 177 Fed. 458; Payseno v. Swenson, 178 Fed. 999.
Alabama: Cook v. Forst, 116 Ala. 395, 22. So. 54o; Richardson v.
Olathe Milling & Elevator Co.,
Ala. , 52 So. 69.
Arkansas: Posten v. Hall. - Ark. 132 S. W. lOO.
California: Oullahan v. Baldwin, ioo Cal. 648, 35 Pac. 3IO; Gunn v.
Bank of California,99 Cal. 349, 33 Pac. i1O5; Mattingly v. Pennie, 105 Cal.
514, 39 Pac. 200, 45 Am. St. Rep. 87; Donlan v. Scanlan, 57 Cal. 261; Neilson
v. Lee, 6o Cal. 555; Phelan v. Gardner, 43 Cal. 306; Mott v. Minor, ii Cal.
App. 774, 1o6 Pac. 244.
Colorado: Wray v. Carpenter, x6 Colo. 271, 27 Pac. 248, 25 Am. St.
Rep. 265; Chaffee v. Widman, Colo. , io8 Pac. 995.
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or, if no particular terms were prescribed, then upon terms acceptConnecticut: Notkins v. Pashalinsky, Conn. 76 Atl. i1O4.
Florida: Carter v. Owens, 58 Fla. 204, 5o So. 641.
Illinois: Wilson v. Mason, 158 II. 304, 42 N. E. 134, 49 Am. St. Rep.
162; Hanrahan v. Ulrich, lO7 II1. App. 626; Pratt v. Hotchkiss, io Ill. App.

603.
Indiana: Fischer v. Bell, g9 Ind. 243; McFarland v. Lillard, 2 Ind. App.

160, 28 N. E. 299, 5o Am. St. Rep. 234; Stauffer v. Linenthal, 29 Ind. App.
305, 64 N. E. 643.

Iowa: Bird v. Phillips, 115 Iowa 703, 87 N. W. 414; Flynn v. Jordal,
123 Iowa 457, ioo N. W. 326.
Kansas: Manker v. Tough, 79 Kan. 46, 98 Pac. 792, i L. R. A. (N. S.)
675; Beougher v. Clark, 81 Kan. 250, io6 Pac. 39, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 198.
Kentucky: Coleman v. Meade, 13 Bush (Ky.), 358; Mitchell V. Weddington (Ky.), 122 S. W. 802 (but see Greene v. Owings, i Ky. L. Rep.
580, 41 S. W. 264.
Maine: Veacie v. Parker, 72 Me. 443; Smith v. Lawrence, 98 Me. 92,
56 Atl. 455.
Maryland: Jones v. Alder, 34 Md. 440; Livezy v. Miller, 6i Md. 336.
Massachusetts: Desmond v. Stebbins, 14o Mass. 339, 5 N. E. 15o; W illard v. Wright, 203 Mass. 4o6, 89 N. E. 559; Gooduough v. Kinney, 205 Mass.
263, 91 N. E. 295.
Michigan: McCreery v. Green, 38 Mich. 172; Fox v. Rouse, 47. Mich.
558, II N. W. 384; Wright v. Beach, 82 Mich. 469, 46 N. W. 673; Wood v.
Smith, 162 Mich. 334, 127 N. W. 277.
Minnesota: Goss v. Stevens, 32 Minn. 472, 21 N. _"T. 549; Cullen v. Bell,
43 Minn. 226, 45 N. W. 428; Fairchildv. Cunningham, 84-Minn. 521, 88 N. W.
15; Hubachek 'v. Hazzard, 83 Minn. 437, 86 N. W. 426.
Missouri: Timberman v. Craddock, 70 Mo. 638; Gaty :v.
Foster, 18
Mo. App. 639; Gelatt v. Ridge, 117 Mo. 553,'23 S. W. 882. Am. St. Rep.
683;'Bell v. Kaiser, 5o Mo. 15o; Tyler v. Parr,52 Mo. 249; Slayback v. Wetzel, 146 Mo. App. 171, 123 S. W. 982; Simmons v. Oneth, 14o Mo. App. 269,
124 S. W. 534; Watkins v. Thomas, 141 Mo. App. 263, 124 S. W. 1o63.
Nebraska: Stewart v. Smith, 5o Neb. 631, 7o N. W. 235; Jones v.
Stevens, 36 Neb. 849; Hallstead v. Perrigo, 87 Neb. 128, 126 N. W. 1078.
New Hampshire: Parker v. Eastabrook, 68 N. H. 349, 44 Atl. 484.
New Jersey: Hinds v. Henry, 36 N. 3. L. 328.
New York: McClane v. Paine, 49 N. Y. 561, io Am. Rep. 431; Duclos
v. Cunningham, io2 N. Y. 678, 6 N. E. 790; Frazer v. Wyckoff, 63 N. Y. 445;
Burling v. Gunther, 12 Daly (N. Y.) 6; Higgins v. Moore, 34 N. Y. 417;
Barnard v. Monnot, 34 Barb. (N. Y.) go; Bacher v. Ratkowsky, 137 App.
Div. (N. Y.) 559, 122 N. Y. Suppl. 225; Phillips v. Kraft, 136 App. Div.
(N. Y.) 859, 122 N. Y. Suppl. 198.
North Carolina: Mallonee v. Young, ii N. C. 549, 26 S. E. 141.
North Dakota: Ward v. McQueen, 13 N. Dak. 153, ioo, N. W. 253.
Ohio: Roush v. Loeffler, 18 Ohio Cir. R. 8o6, 6 Ohio Cir. Dec. 76o.
Oklahoma: Yoder v. Randol, 16 Okla. 3o8, 83 Pac. 537, 3 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 576; Scully v. Williamson, 26 Okla. ig, io8 Pac. 395.
Penusyl7ania: Pratt v. Patterson's Ex'rs, 112 Pa. 475, 3 Atl. 858; Turner v. Baker, 225 Pa. 359, 74 Atl. 172.
Rhode Island: Butler v. Baker, 17 R. I. 582, 23 Atl. 1019, 33.Am. St.
Rep. 897.
South Dakota: Howie v. Bratrud, 14 S. Dak. 648, 86 N. W. 747; Minder & Jorgenson Land Co. v. Brustuen, S. Dak. -,
124 N. W. 723.
. Tennessee: Cheatham v. Yarbrough, 9o Tenn. 77, 15 S. W. lO76; Woodall v. Foster, 91 Tenn. 195, 18 S. W. 241.
Teeas: Gibson v. Gray, 17.Tex. Civ. App. 646, 43 S. W. 922; O'Brien
v. Gilliland, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 40, 23 S. W. 244.
Washington: Hege, Hackez & Phillips Co. v. Hessel, 57 Wash. 499,
107 Pac. 375.
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able to the principal.6
SEC. 4. WHEN Is SUCH A PURCHASER "FouND?"-When
a purchaser is to be deemed to be "found" or "produced" within
the
meaning of this rule, is a question upon which there is some difference of opinion. (i) If the broker has obtained from a proper person and delivered to his principal a written contract to purchase, or
-since he may not be authorized to sign a written contract-a written offer to purchase which the principal can immediately turn into
a written contract by accepting it, he would ordinarily be deemed
West Virginia: Hugill v. Weekley, 64 W. Va. 21o, 61 S. E.
36o, I5
1262.
Wisconsin: McArthur v. Slauson, 53 Wis. 41, 9 N. W. 784; Barthell
v.
Peter,88 Wis. 316, 6D N. W. 429, 43 Am. St. Rep. 906; Ames v.
Wis. 531, 83 N. W. 780; McCabe v. Jones, 141 Wis. 54o, 124 N. Lamont, 107
W. 486.
6. When no terms are specified, the purchaser produced must
ordinarily
be one ready, willing and able to buy upon terms satisfactory
to the seller.
See Cadigan,v. Crabtree, 179 Mass. 474, 64 N. E. 37, 88 Am. St.
L. R. A. 77; Walker v.- Tirrell, ioi Mass. 257, 3 Am. Rep. 352; R. 397, 55
Seabury v.
Fidelity Ins. Co., 2o5 Pa. 234, 54 AtI. 898.
As has been seen in an earlier section, the principal may expressly
keep
the matter wholly within his own control, as by stipulating that
he will pay
commissions only if he approves the sale, or if he then sees fit
to
he accepts the purchaser. See Stewart v. Pickering, 73 Iowa 652, sell, or if
35 N. W.
6go; Ilker
v. Tirrell, ioi Mass. 257, 3 Am. Rep. 352; Condict v. Cowdrey,
139 N. Y. 273, 34 N. E. 781; Hungerford v. Hicks, 39 Conn. 259.
That the terms are satisfactory to the seller may ordinarily
be shown
either (i) by the fact that the sale was actually consummated,
or (2) by the
fact that the seller actually accepted the buyer as a satisfactory
though for some reason (not the fault of the broker) the seller one, even
afterwards
permits the sale to fail.
0T.) That the sale was actually consummated: Conkling v. Krakauer,
70 Tex. 735, I1 S. W. X17; Hanna v. Collins, 69 Iowa 5I, 28
N.
Cassaday v. Seeley, 69 Iowa 509, 29 N. W. 432; Iselin v. Griffth, W. 431;
62 Iowa
668, 18 N. W. 302; Cook v. Fiske, 12 Gray (Mass.), 491; Keys
v. Johnson,
68 Pa. 42; Glenthworth v. Luther, 21 Barb. (N. Y.) 145; 'Coleman
v. Meade,
13 Bush (Ky.), 358; Hugill v'. Weekley, 64 W. Va. 21o, 61
S. E. 360, 15
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1262.
A "sale" is effected within this rule not only when
actual conveyance
has been made, but also where, upon the production of an
a satisfactory buyer.
a binding contract between the seller and buyer is entered into,
even though
the sale afterwards fails, through no fault in the broker's
performance:
Rice v. Mayo, io7 Mass. 550; Veazie v. Parker,72 Me. 443; Cook
v. Fiske,
78 Mass. (12 Gray) 491; Ward v. Cobb, 148 Mass. P18, 20 N. E.
V. Smith, 176 Mass. 595, 58 N. E. 152, 79 Am. St. R. 345; Carnes 174; Roche
i8o Mass. 572, 63 N. E. 122; Pearson v. Mason, i2o Mass. 53; v. Howard,
Baker, 45 Minn. 83, 47 N. W. 452; Coleman v. Meade, 13 Bush Francis v.
Keys v. Johnson, 68 Pa. 42; Love v. Miller, 53 Ind. 294; Fox (Ky.), 358;
III. 39r, 88 N. -E. 974; Hugill v. Weekley, 64 W. Va. 210, 61 S.v. Ryan, 24o
E. 36o, 15
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1262; Wenks v. Hazard,Iowa
1-,
27 N.
In Cook v. Fiske, where the undertaking of the broker was W. io9g.
to find a
hirer for a ship, it was held that he had performed when he had
parties together and a valid oral contract had been made, even brought the
though no
charter party was ever executed and the transaction therefore
fell through.
(2.)
The principal may also, by words or conduct, accept the buyer produced by the broker as one satisfactory to him, and if he does
so
has earned his commission, although the later negotiations betweenthe broker
the parties never even ripen into a binding contract, to say nothing of an
actual con-

L R. A. (N. S.)
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7
(2) When the broker has
to have performed his undertaking.
brought forward, or designated and put the principal into communication with, a suitable person to whom the principal may sell in
the ordinary course of business, he has, by the weight of authority,
performed his undertaking, even if, through no fault of the broker's,
no sale actually takes place;s although there are cases which hold

veyance. Thus Davis v. Morgan, 96 Ga. 518, 23 S. E. 417 (where the prinhim
cipal "accepted the proposed purchaser without objection, recognizing
157
SO.
5
151,
Ala.
86
Wilson,
v.
Sayre
;
requirements")
the
all
answering
as
pro(where it is said that if the principal accepts a married woman as the
posed purchaser, he waives any objection upon that ground); Krahner v.
Hellman, 16 Daly (N. Y.), 132 (where the principal "accepted the purchaser,
See, also,
but afterwards declined to enter into a contract with her").
Blodgett v. Sioux City, etc., R. Co., 63 Iowa 6o6, ig N. W. 799.
On the other hand, it may be entirely possible that a preliminary, tentative or provisional contract may have been entered into between the principal
and the proposed purchaser without finally accepting him as satisfactory-bd
can
merely for the purpose of holding the matter until further inquiriesrejecting
made. This would not preclude the principal from afterwards
Mass.
him, so far as the broker is concerned. See Burnham v. Upton, 174 St.
R.
1019, 33 Am.
4o8, 54 N. E. 873; Butler vz. Baker, 17 R. I. 582, 23 Atl.
Montgomery v.
897; Crombie v. Waldo, 137 N. Y. 129, 32 I'. B. 1O42;
End
Knickerbocker, 27 App. Div. 117, 5o N. Y. Suppl. 128; Murray v. East
Imp. Co. (Ky.), 6o S. W. 648.
Especially is this true where the acceptance, if any, was made upon the
strength of the broker's representations and not upon any independent
v.
knowledge on the part of the principal: Butler v. Baker, supra; Crombie
Waldo, supra.
Again, the contract may be one which gave the buyer the option to
Fox v.
withdraw, and if he does so there may be no sale. See post, § 13; 33 Pac.
Land Co., 37 Colo. 253, 86 Pac. 344; Aigler v. Land Co., 51 Kan. 718,
593; Lawrence v. Rhodes, i88 Ill. 96, 58 N. E. 9io; Lawrence v. Pederson,
34 Wash. I, 74 Pac. io11, and other cases cited in the section referred to.
had
In Mortgage Co. v. Davis, 96 Tex. 5o4, 17 S. W. 17, the broker
produced a man with whom the owners negotiated. After offer and counter
To
offer, the defendants sent him, through the plaintiff's hands, an offer.
to
this offer he mailed an acceptance, but he changed his mind, by telegram
the postmaster succeeded in recalling his letter, and notified the defendants,
knew
the owners, of his entire unwillingness to take the land. The owners court
nothing of the first letter until the broker sued for commission. The
mailed
held that inasmuch as the -defendants' offer had not been by mail, nocontract,
acceptance was binding until received; that therefore there was no
been
and that since at no other time and in no other way had the customerbroker
presented ready, able and willing to deal upon defendants' terms, the
had earned no commission.
court said: "In
7. In Flynn v. Jordal, 124 Iowa 457, ioo N. W. 326, the
Johnson Bros. v. Wright, 124 Iowa 61, 99 N. W. io3, we held that, to earn

commission for services rendered in finding a purchaser of land, where

his
oblino sale is actually consummated, the agent must either procure a valid
purchaser
gation to buy, and tender it to the vendor, or bring the proposed
into if
and the vendor together, so that a contract of sale may be entered
the latter so elects."
See, also, Young v. Ruhwedel, 119 Mo. App. 231, 96 S. W. 228; 'Carnes
v. Howard, i8o Mass. 569, 63 N. E. 122.
The broker who produces a written offer, which the principal, by signRyer v.
ing, may at once turn into a contract, has produced a purchaser.
Turkel, 75 N. J. L. 677, 7o Atl. 68; Flynn vi. $ordal, supra.
8. In Gunn v. Bank of California, 99 Cal. 349, 33 Pac. i1o5, the court
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that a written contract between the buyer and the seller is essential
said: "But the question here is: What is 'finding' or 'producing' a purchaser within the meaning of the rule of law declared in this and the other
cases cited? Is it sufficient for a broker to merely find a person financially
able, and who verbally agrees with him to purchase upon the terms of the
vendor, and makes a deposit, but who neither signs a binding agreement to
purchase upon such terms, nor is produced before the vendor as a person
ready and willing to enter into such a contract? It seems to us very clear
that this question must be answered in the negative. The contract of the
broker
is tobenegotiate
is, to
a valid
contract
which can
enforced abysale;
the that
vendor
if procure
his title is
perfect;
or if to
he purchase,
does not
together,
that the
procure such
contract,
bring
the
vendortomay
vendor
and thb proposed purchaser
secure such a contract,
uless he is willing to
trust
to App.
an oral
Followed in Shepherd-Teagne
Co. io6
v. Hermann,
12 Cal.
394,agreement."
107 Pac. 622; Mote v. Minor,
ii Cal. App. 774,
Pac. 244.
Baars v.is:Hyland,
Minn.
15O,a 67
nextInquestion
N. W. has"
1148,heit agent
was said:
When, 65
under
such
contract,
earned"The
his
commissions by finding a purchaser? Is it when the agent himself has found
the purchaser, or when the principal has found him, through the agent? Is
it sufficient that the agent has himself found a person ready and willing
to buy, or must he produce that person to his principal? Must he bring the
parties together, so that the principal has also found the purchaser? We
are clearly of the opinion that he must. He must at least put the principal
in communication with the proposed purchaser. The principal must have
an opportunity to make a binding contract with the proposed purchaser
before the agent has earned his commission."
In Platt v. Johr, land. App. 58, 36 N. E. 294, it was said: "W her a

broker is to 'introduce' a purchaser, or to 'find' or 'procure' one, or whether
he is words
to do all
these
things combined,
duties
remainused
practically
the same.
The
'find,'
'procure,
'introduce,'hisare
generally
synonymously
in
the making of such contracts, and, whether used conjunctively or disjunctively, the essential thing they require the broker to do is to secure a customer who is or will become a purchaser."
In Hayden v. Gr
e,Mo.
p5 App. 647, the court said: "Now, what does
aproperty
real estate
contractprice,
to do?
to effect a valid sale of the
for broker
a stipulated
and, He
in agrees
consideration
of this, the owner

agrees to pay hun a certain per cent of the purchase money as commissions
for his trouble. This contract, on the part of the broker, is complete when
he delivers or tenders to the owner a valid written contract, containing the
terms of sale agreed on, signed by a party able to comply therewith, or to
answer in damages if he should fail to perform. This is all the agent can
do, and when it is doneche is entitled to his commissions. But the necessity
of a written contract of sale may be rendered unnecessary if the agent bring
the vendor and vendee together, and the latter is able and willing and offers
togomplete the contract, provided the vendor will make the conveyance. In
sur a case the agent has done all that he can do, and if the vendor under
such circumstances refused to complete the sale, he, nevertheless, will be
compelled to pay the agent his commissions." See, also, McCray
c.
Pfosty
xi8 Mo. App. 672, 94 S. W. 998.
In in
Gelatt
Ridge,
Mo. estate
553, 23
S. W.performs
882, it was
"It is
is entiwell
settled
this v.state
that 117
a real
broker
his said:
duty and

tled to his commission when a purchaser is introduced who is ready, willing
and able to buy on the terms authorized by the principal. The completion
of a valid and binding written contract is not required in case the principal
is in a situation to execute it himself. It may, and doubtless often does,.
happen
purchaser
would
dealing ifwith
So cause
it is
held thatthat
the the
agent
is entitled
to hisprefer
commission
he isthe
theowner.
procuring

of negotiations which result in the sale, even though the negotiations are
conducted and concluded by the principal in person."
In McDonald v. Smith., 99 Minn. 2, lO8 N. W. 29o, it is said: "A real
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in any event.,9 and there may easily be such forms of undertaking or
such special circumstances as to require a written contract or even a
completed sale.'" (3) When the broker has, by whatever method
estate broker in order to earn 'a commission for finding a purchaser must
either obtain a contract from a proposed purchaser able to buy whereby he is
legally bound to buy on the'authorized terms, or he must produce to his principal a proposed purchaser who is able, willing and ready to buy upon the
terms authorized. It is not necessary that the principal and 'the purchaser
actually be brought face to face, but the principal must be notified that such
purchaser has been found and afforded a full opportunity to make a binding
contract for the sale of the land on the authorized terms. If the broker
complies with either of the conditions stated he is entitled, unless he has
stipulated to the contrary, to his commission, although no sale is finally
consummated."
See, also, Fitzpatrick v. Gilson, 176 Mass. 477, 57 N. E. iooo; Middleton
v. Thompson, 163 Pa. 112, 29 Atl. 796; Mattingly v. Pennie, io5 Cal. 514,
39 Pac. 2oo; Buckingham v. Harris, 1O Colo. 455, 15 Pac. 817; Merriman v.
Wickersham, 141 Cal. 567, 75 Pac. i8o; Hildenbrand v. Lillis, io Colo. App.
522, 51 Pac. ioo8; Wiggins v. Wilson, 55 Fla. 346, 45 So. ioli; Vaughan v.
McCarthy, 5y Minn. 199, 6o N. W. 1075; Duclos v.Cunningham, 102 N. Y.
678, 6 N. E. 790; Mooney v. Elder, 56 N. Y. 238; Cheathaam v. Yarbrough,
90 Tenn. 77, 15 S.W. lO76; Barnes v. German, etc., Society, 21 Wash. 448,
58 Pac. 569; Magill v. Stoddard, 70 Wis. 75, 35 N. W. 346.
Statute of Frauds: The fact that the purchaser produced, who is ready,
willing and able to buy, might be able to avoid the contract under the statute
of frauds, will not defeat the broker's right to commissions, where the buyer
has not shown any intention to take advantage of the statute: Sayre v. Wilson, 86 Ala. 151, 5 So. 157; Vaughan v. Mc~arthy, 59 Minn. i99, 6o N. W.
S75"atisfactory Purchaser: Where the terms are not fixed, but the price,
the conditions or the purchaser are to be "satisfactory," this means, ordinarily, satisfactory to the principal, and the broker ordinarily takes his
chances of being able to satisfy the principal in the matter. See Forrester
v. Price, 6 N. Y. Misc. 308, 26 N. Y. Suppl. 799.
The case is stronger where the stipulation is to pay commission "in
case of a sale at figures satisfactory to us" (the principals). Weibler v.
Cook, 77 N. Y. App. Div. 637, 78 N. Y. Suppl. lO9.
Where real estate agents, for an agreed compensation, undertake to find
a purchaser satisfactory to the owner, he alone has the right to determine
the consideration for which he will sell and the details governing the payment therefor: Kilham v. Wilson, 112 Fed. 565.
But in Mullally v. Greenwood, 127 Mo. 138, 29 S. W. ioom, where the
agreement was to pay commissions for negotiating a "satisfactory lease," the
court said: "We do not think that the defendants (principals) had the right
to say, arbitrarily and without cause, that the lease contracted for by plaintiff for them was not satisfactory to them. It was their duty to act fairly
and honestly and in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the plaintiff, as implied from the contract, its subject-matter, and the facts and circumstances surrounding its execution, its nature, object and purpose."
9. "The true rule is that the broker is entitled to his commissions if the
purchaser presented by him and the vendor, his principal, enter into a valid,
binding and enforceable contract." Wilson v. Mason, 158 Ill. 304, 42 N. E.
134, 49 Am. St. R. 162.
(But compare Monroe v. Snow, 131 Ill. 126, 23 N. E. 401; Hersher v.
Wells, 1o3 Ill. App. 418, in which last case it is said that in Wilson v. Mason
there was no intention to change the well-settled rule upon the subject.)
See, also, Jenkins v. Hollingsworth, 83 Ill. App. 139.
io. See Hale v. Kunler, 29 C. C. A. 67, 85 Fed. 161; Hyams v. Miller,
71 Ga. 608; Gilchrist v. Clarke, 86 Tenn. 583, 8 S.W. 572; Parker v. Walker,
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found, and induced the purchase by, a person to whom the principal
has in fact sold, there could seem to be no doubt that the broker has
performed his undertaking, under any rule.1 1
SEC. 5. It was thought at one time, and still seems to be
required in some states, that a purchaser had not been "produced"
within the meaning of the second rule until he had been brought
face to face with the seller; but this seems not to be indispensable if
there be other substantial and satisfactory evidence of his existence
and his readiness and ability to purchase.1 '
Nevertheless, it is not enough for the broker merely to assert
that there is somewhere somebody who is ready tq purchase, but
without either producing such purchaser to show for himself, or
86 Tenn. 566, 8 S. W. 391; Tombs v. Alexander, ioi Mass. 255, 3 Am. Rep.
349; Kerfoot v. Steele, 113 Ill. 61o (broker to purchase) ; 'Condict v. Cowdrey, I39 N. Y. 273, 34 N. E. 781; Ford v. Brown, 120 Cal. 551, 52 Pac. 817;
Kost v. Reilly, 62 Conn. 57, 24 Atl. 519; Boyd v. Watson, 1o1 Iowa 214, 70
N. W. r2o; Stewart v. Fowler, 37 Kan. 677, 15 Pac. 918.
AcruAL SALE REQuImE: In Hyams v. Miller, supra, the court said:

"The contract between these parties was, that the plaintiff was not only to
find a purchaser for defendant's property, but he was to make actual sale of
the same upon the terms proposed by defendant." In Hale v. Kninler,
supra, which involved the consolidation of certain street railway properties,
the agreement was express that commission should be paid only if and when
consolidation actually took place. In Condict v. Cowdrey, supra, the commission was to be "on the price I may accept." In Ford v. Brown, supra,
the contract contemplated an actual receipt of the price, the broker being
authorized to retain all above a certain sum as his commission. To same
effect: Crockett v. Grayson, 98 Va. 354, 36 S. E. 477; Munroe v. Taylor, 19I
Mass. 483, 78 N. . io6.
In Flower v. Davidson, 44 Minn. 46, 46 N. W. 308, the contract was to
pay commissions "on the completion of the transfer of said property." See,
also, GCremer v. Miller, 56 Minn. 52, 57 N. W. 318; Goodwin v. Siemez, 1o6
Minn. 368, 118 N. W. ioo8; Lindley v. Fay, ig Cal. 239, 5I Pac. 333 (contract to pay "out of the first money received").
In Ormsby v. Graham, 123 Iowa 2o2, 8 N. W. 724, the broker was, by
the contract, required to draw all necessary papers, collect the cash payment,
and do many other things which could only be done when the transfer was
actually consummated. See, also, Felts v. Butcher, 93 Iowa 414, 6I N. W. 991.
In Murray v. Rickard, 1o3 Va. 132, 48 S. E. 871, the contract contemplated that the broker was to be paid out of the payments as made by the
purchaser upon the purchase price. After making two payments (out of
which the broker received his pro rata commission), the contract with the
purchaser was canceled in pursuance of one of its provisions giving that
right. Held, that the broker was not entitled to any further commissions.
Where the agreement is to pay the commission when the buyer has paid
a certain amount and executed notes and mortgage for the residue, no recovery can be had by the bioker until these acts are done. McPhail v. Buell,
87 Cal. 115, 25 Pac. 266.

Where the agreement was to pay the broker for "disposing of" certain
property, an exchange which failed because the party produced by the broker
could not make a clear title to the land he proposed to convey was held not
to satisfy the requirement. Greusel v. Dean, 98 Iowa 405, 67 N. W. 275.
i. See Desmond v. Stebbins, 14o Mass. 339, 5 N. E. 15o.
12. See McDonald v. Smith, 99 Minn. 42, io8 N. W. 291, supra. (-Compare Gunn v. Bank of California,99 Cal. 349, 33 Pac. rlo5, supra).
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substantial evidefinitely designating him or producing some other
13
purchase.
to
readiness
and
existence
dence of his
A broker who would recover for producing a purchaser, notwithstanding an attempted repudiation of the offer by the principal,
must show that he had in fact substantially performed before such
repudiation. 14
SEC. 6. CONTRACT IN PARTICULAR CASES MAY REQUIRE LESs.
-It'is, of course, entirely possible that the agreement between the
broker and the principal may not require that the broker shall bring
about a "sale" in any sense. Thus the offer of the principal may be
that he will compensate the broker if the latter will "assist" him in
finding a purchaser ;15 or if he shall be "in any manner instrumental"
in finding a purchaser;16 or if the broker will "urge" someone to
buy,17 etc.; and in all of these cases the broker, having done what
he agreed to do, may recover compensation.
SEC. 7. CONTRACT WITH BROKER NEED NOT BE IN WRITING.These agreements with the broker to pay a commission for finding
a purchaser for real estate are not within the Statute of Frauds,
8
In some states, howand hence are valid though not in writing.'
ever, special statutes require writing.
13. As said in a Missouri case (Huaggins v. Hearne, 74 Mo. App. 86)
where the broker contended that he had found a purchaser in Iowa: "Is
plaintiff to be allowed to recover on the mere supposition that he might get
the purchaser to come down from Iowa? Suppose he had written him to
come; there is not a particle of evidence to suggest that he would have
complied."
14. In Mattingly v. Pennie, io5 Cal. 514, 39 Pac. 2oo, the broker had not
"found" a purchaser within the requirements of the California rule which
demands either a written contract to buy or an actual production of the
buyer to the principal. (See Gunn v. Bank of California,99 Cal. 349, quoted
from in a preceding note.) The broker attempted to excuse himself on the
ground that the defendant had repudiated the contract, and that therefore
he had prevented him from performing. The court found that there was,
in fact, no repudiation, but said that while the rule might be as contended in
the case of bilateral contracts, it was not so where, as here, the contract
was unilateral. In such a case "the party to whom the promise is made cannot recover without proof of performance of the condition upon which *the
promise depends; and in such cases a mere refusal by the promisor to perform, or even an entire repudiation by him of the contract, does not of
itself amount to prevention."
15.

Terry v. Reynolds, iii

x7.

Tuffree v. Saint, -

Wis. 122, 86 N. W. 557; Wyckoff v. Kerr,

123 N. W. 733; Bast 'v. Hill, 62 Ill. 216.
S. Dak. In Hugill v. Weekley, 64 W. Va. 2io, 61 S. E. 360, 15 L. t_ A. (N. S.)
1262, the undertaking was "to make all the effort possible to make sale" of
certain property.
16. Myers v. Moore, 85 Neb. 715, 124 N. W. 157.
-

Iowa, -

, 126 N. W. 373.

18. Waterman Real Estate Exchange v. Stephens, 71 Mich. 1O4, 38
N. W. 685; Young v. Ruhwedel, i19 Mo. App. 231, 96 S. W. 228; Friedman
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SEC. 8. BROKER MUST BE PROCURING CAUSE-MAY BE SUCH
THOUGH NOT PRESENT AT SALE-DIRECTNESS OF CAUsE-It is not
necessary that the broker should personally have conducted the negotiations between his principal and the purchaser which have resulted
in the sale,19 or that he should have been present when the bargain
was completed, 20 or even that the principal should, at the time, have
2
It is
known that the purchaser was one found by the broker.
Fac. 726, 9 L R. A. (N. S.) 933; Lesley v. Rosson,
39 Miss. 368, 77 Am. Dec. 679; Baker v. Wainwright, 36 Md. 336, 11 Am.
Rep. 495; Callaway v. Pettyman, 218 Pa. 293, 67 Atl. 418; Monroe v. Snow,
131 Ill. 126, 23 N. E. 4O1; McCurry v. Hawkins, 83 Ark. 202, 1O3 S. W. 6oo.
In a few states by statute the broker cannot recover commissions except
there be a written contract of employment between him and the owner:
California, Civil Code (igo6), § 1624, subd. 6: McGeary v. Satchwell,
129 Cal. 389, 62 Pac. 58; Shanklin. v. Hall, ioo Cal. 26, 34 Pac. 636.
Indiana, § 6629a, Burns' Ann. Sts. (igoi): Beahler v. Clark, 32 Ind.
App. 222, 68 N. E. 613.
Montana, Civ. Code, § 2185. subsec. 6: Marshall v. Trerise, 33 Mont

v. Suttle, io Ariz. 57, 85

28, 81 Pac. 4oo.

Nebraska, Comp. Sts. (199o), §4829 (ch. 73, sec. 74): Blair v. Austin,

71 Neb. 4O, 98 N. W. io4o; Baker v. Gillan, 68 Neb. 368, 94 N. W. 615.

New Jersey, Gen'l Sts., p. i6o4, § IO: Leimbach v. Regner, 70 N. J. L.
6D8, 57 Atl. 138.
Nor can there be a recovery on quantum meruit: Beahler .v. Clark,
supra; Blair v. Austin, supra; Leimbach v. Regner, supra.
A statute making it a misdemeanor for any person in cities of first and
second class to offer for sale real property without written authority is unconstitutional, and a broker employed orally may recover commissions. Fisher v.
Woods, 187 N. Y. go, 79 N. E. 836, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 707.
1g. Royster v. Mageveney, 9 Lea (Tenn.), 148; Timberman v.
Craddock, 7o Mo. 638; Scott v. Patterson, 53 Ark. 49, 13 S. W. 419; Gelatt
v. Ridge, 117 Mo. 553, 23 S. W. 882; Lipscomb v. Cole, 81 Mo. App. 53;
Rigdon v. More, 226 Ill 382, 8o N. E. gOl; Henry v. Stewart, 185 Ill. 448,
57 N. E. i9o; Pate v. Marsh, 65 Ill. App. 482; Hill vz. McCoy, i Cal. App.
159, 8I Pac. lo15; Reishus-Remer Land Co. v. Benner, 91 Minn. 4O, 98
N. W. 186; Dreisback v. Rollins, 39 Kan. 268, i8 Pac. 187.
2o. Royster v. Mageveney, supra; Timberinan v. Craddock, supra; Sibbald v. Bethlehem Iron Works, 83 N. Y. 378, 38 Am. Rep. 441; Dreisback v.
Rollins, 39 Kan. 268, 18 Pac. 187; Hill v. McCoy, supra; Scott v. Clark, 3
S. Dak. 486, 54 N. W. 538.
2r. Goffe v. Gibson, 18 Mo. App. i; Sussdorff v. Schmidt, 55 N. Y. 320;
Wylie v. Marine Nat. Bank, 6I N. Y. 415; Kelly v. Stone, 94 Iowa 316, 62
N. W. 842; Rounds v. Allee, 116 Iowa 345, 89 N. W. io98; Boyd & Williams
v. Watson, ioi Iowa 214, 70 N. W. 120; Hambleton v. Fort, 58 Neb. 282, 78
N. W. 498; Gilbert v. McCullough, -

Iowa

25 N. W. 73; Bryan v.
1-,

Abert, 3 App. Cas. D. C. i8o; Ross v. Moskowitz (Tex. Civ. App.) 95 S. W.
N. J. L.
86, S. C. IOO Tex. 434, 100 S. W. 768; Laughlin v. Campbell, -

74 Atl. 530; Graves v. Woodward, 78 Tex. 92, 14 S. W. 256; Stiewal v. Lally,
89 Ark. 195, 115 S. W. 1134; Adams v. Decker, 34 Ill. App. 17; Millan v.

Porter,31 Mo. App. 563.
In fungeblut v. Gindra, 134 App. Div. 291, 118 N. Y. Suppl. 942, it was
held that, while generally it is immaterial that the owner was ignorant that a
purchaser was produced by the broker, yet where, on request to disclose the
probable purchaser, the broker gave the name of another, and the owner subsequently sold to the broker's customer, in good faith and without knowledge,
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indispensable, 22 but it is also sufficient, that his efforts were the efficient, procuring or producing cause of the sale ;2' that through his
agency the purchaser was brought into communication with the

and deducted a broker's commissions from the price, the broker cannot recover.
In Boyd v. Improved Property Holding Co., 135 App. Div. 623, 120 N. Y,
Suppl. 85o, the owner offered a commission in case plaintiff furnished the name
of one to whom the owner made a lease. The plaintiff tried to interest a
lessee, who subsequently leased from the owner, but the plaintiff did not disclose the name because requested not to do so. The court said: "He 'has
failed to perform the one thing that was required of him, and that was to
mention the proposed tenant's name to the owner."
In Quist v. Goodfellow, 99 Minn. 5o9, Iio N. W. 65, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.)
153, the court said: "Some of the authorities hold that a real estate broker
is entitled to his stipulated commission where his efforts were in fact the procuring cause of a sale, though made by the owner in good faith and in
ignorance of his efforts; but such is not the law of this state. "Here the purchaser, with whom the broker was negotiating to the knowledge of the
owner, procured a third person to make the purchase directly from the owner,
the third person stating to the owner that the purchase was in his own behalf,
and in consideration of which and the fact that there would be no commissions to pay, the owner reduced the price." This, the court says, has been
the law in Minnesota since Cathcartv. Bacon, 47 Minn. 34, 49 N. W. 331.
In Gerding v. Haskin, 141 N. Y. 514, 36 N. E. 6ol, the broker introduced to the owner a person who offered to buy on the owner's terms on
behalf of a newly-created syndicate, giving the names of those who had thus
far agreed to enter the syndicate, but before the syndicate was fully formed
the owner sold the land to others. Held, that the owner was entitled to
know who the purchasers were, and that, as all had not been disclosed at
the time of the sale, no commission could be recovered.
22. No matter how strenuous the broker's efforts have been, he is not
entitled to the commission unless he was the procuring cause: McCloskey
v. Thompson, 26 N. Y. Misc. 735, 56 N. Y. Suppl. 1O76; Thuner v. Kanter,
io2 Mich. 59, 6o N. W. 299; Douville v. Comstock, nIo Mich. 693, 69 N. W.
79; Putnam v. How, 39 Minn. 363, 40 N. W. 258; Burkholder v. Fonner, 34
Neb. I, 51 N. W. 293; Auerbach v. Internationale Gesellschaft, 177 Fed. 458;
Hartley v. Anderson, 15o Pa. St. 391, 24 Atl. 675; Kiefer v. Yoder, 198 Pa.
308, 47 AtI. 974.
See Rice v. Omberg, 25 Ky. Law R. 531, 76 S. W. 15, in which a buyer
who knew that property was for sale at a given net price employed the plaintiff broker, to secure a purchase at this price, with a stipulation in the contract that the seller pay the current taxes. The sale went through, but only
upon terms which gave the current taxes to the buyer to pay. Upon the
ground that the agent failed in the very undertaking for which he was
employed, the court refused him commissions.
23. Many other forms of expression are found in the cases, apparently
without any real difference in meaning. Thus it is said he must be the
"procuring cause": Hill v. Jebb, 55 Ark. 574, 18 S. W. io47; Dolan v. Scanlan, 57 Cal. 261; Liveay v. Miller, 61 Md. 336; Frazer v. Wyckoff, 63 N. Y.
445; or the "efficient cause" or "agent": Henderson v. Vincent, 84 Ala. 99,
4 So. ix8o; Lyon v. Mitchell, 36 N. Y. 235, 93 Am. Dec. 5o2; or "immediate
cause": Gleason v. Nelson, 162 Mass. 245, 38 N. E. 497; or "the efficient
or effective cause or means of bringing about the actual sale"; Whitcomb
v. Bacon, i7o Mass. 479, 49 N. E. 742; Dowling V. Morrill, 165 Mass. 491,
43 N. E. 295; or "controlling cause"" Brooks v. Leathers, 112 Mich. 463,
7o N. W. io99; or "proximate and procuring": Latshaw v. Moore, 53 Kan.
234, 36 Pac. 342; or "proximate cause': Schmidt v. Baumann, 36 Minn. i89,
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seller, although the parties then negotiated in person. 2 ' His efforts
may have been slight, but if they brought about the desired result,
no more could be asked; and their operations may have been circuitous, but if the purchase was the natural and proximate result of
his endeavors, it is sufficient. 25 The law prescribes no particular
method of procedure, nor has it any other standard by which to
measure exertion, in such a case, than the result attained.
(To be continued)

70 N. W. 765; Timberinan v. Craddock, 70 Mo. 638; Adams v. Decker, 34

Ill. App. 17; Millan v. Porter, 31 Mo. App. 563.
The broker may be the procuring cause though the person he dealt with
was only the agent of the real purchaser. Henry v. Stewart, 185 Iil. 448, 57
N. E. i9o.
24. Timberman v. Craddock, 70 Mo. 638; Bell v. Kaiser, 50 Mo. 15o;
Tyler v. Parr,52 Mo. 249; Royster v. Mageveney, 9 Lea (Tenn.), 148; Sussdorff v. Schmidt, supra; Veazie v. Parker,72 Me. 443; Wyckoff v. Bliss, 12
Daly (N. Y.), 324; Attrill v. Patterson,58 Md. 226; Hunton v. Marshall, 76
Ark. 375, 88 S. W. 963; Hafner v. Herron, 165 Ill. 242, 46 N. E. 211; Shannon v. Potts, 117 Ill. App. 8o; Plant v. Thompson, 42 Kan. 664, 22 Pac. 726,
16 Am. St. Rep. 512; Marlatt v. Elliott, 69 Kan. 477; Whitcomb v. Bacon,
17o Mass. 479, 49 N. E. 742; Hubbard v. Leiter, 145 Mich. 387, lo8 N. W.
735; Wood v. Smith, 162 Mich. 334, 127 N. W. 277; Crowley Co. v. Myers, 69
N. J. L. 245, 55 Atl. 305; Boove v. Gage, 127 Wis. 245, Io6 N. W. 1o74; McCormack v. Henderson, ioo Mo. App. 647, 75 S. W. 171; Cohen v. Ames,
Iowa - , 125
235 Mass. i86, 91 N. E. 212; Gilbert v. McCullough, Iowa i, 126 N. W. 373; F. H., etc.,
N. W. 173; Tuffree v. Saint, Gerhardt, etc., Co. v. Marjorie, 144 Mo. App. 620, 129 S. W. 419; Corbel v.
Beard, 92 Iowa 36o, 6o N. W. 636; Gouge v. Hoyt, 127 Iowa 340, iot N. W.
463; Somers v. Wescoat, 66 N. J. L. 551, 49 Atl. 462; Anderson v. Olson, 1o9
Minn. 432, 124 N. W. 3; Lipscomb v. Mastin, i42 Mo. App. 228, 125 S. W.
1177; Wood v. Wells, io3 Mich. 32o, 61 N. W. 503; Bowser v. Field (Tex.),
17 S. W. 45.
25. Lincoln v. McClatchie, 36 Conn. 136; Schlegal v. Allerton, 65 Conn.
260, 32 Atl. 363; Hoadley v. Savings Bank, 71 Conn. 599, 42 Atl. 667, 44
L. R. A. 321; Green v. Bartlett, I4 C. B. (N. S.) 681; Shepherd v. Hedden,
29 N. J. L. 334; Pope v. Beals, i08 Mass. 56I; Gleason v. Nelson, 162 Mass.
245, 38 N. E. 497; Burke v. Cogswell, 39 Minn. 344, 40 N. W. 252; St. Felix
v. Green, 34 Neb. 800, 52 N. W. 821; Mattes v. Engel, 15 S. Dak. 330, 89

N. W. 651.

In Hoadley v. Savings Bank, supra,it is said: "If any act of the broker
in pursuance of his authority to find a purchaser is the initiatory step that
leads to the sale consummated, the owner must pay the commission."
In Roberts v. Markham,. 26 Okla. 387, lO9 Pac. 127, the court quotes
with approval this statement from Tyler v. Parr,52 Mo. 249: "If, after the
property is placed in.the agent's hands, the sale is brought about or produred
by his advertisements and exertions, he will be entitled to his commissions;
or if the agent introduces the purchaser, or discloses his name, to the seller,
and through such introduction or disclosure negotiations are begun, and the
sale of the property is effected, the agent is entitled to his commissions,
though the sale may be made by the owner." Same effect: Stinde v. Blesch,
42 Mo. App. 578; Bass v. Jacobs, 63 Mo. App. 393; Timberinan v. Craddock,
70 Mo. 638; Gelatt v. Ridge, 117 Mo. 553, 23 S. W. 882.
Some illustrations of what has been deemed sufficient in such cases may
be of use: Thus in Lincoln v. McClatchie, 36 Conn. 136, the defendant had
put into the hands of the plaintiff, a real estate broker, a house on a certain
street to sell for $6,500, instructing him not to advertise it, but to sell by
private sale. Afterwards the plaintiff advertised in general terms that he
had houses on that street to sell. One G, who lived on the street, who had
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been looking for a house on the same street for his friend B, saw the advertisement and went to plaintiff's office, where he learned that defendant's
house wis for sale. Plaintiff, by mistake, had entered the price on his books
at $6,ooo and so informed G. G informed B that the house was for sale at
$6,ooo and advised him to buy it. B then examined the house and entered
into negotiations with defendant, which resulted in B's purchase of the house,
with less than a hundred dollars' worth of personal property included, at
$6,5oo. B never saw plaintiff in the transaction and was never in his office,
and G's action was purely voluntary. It was held, however, that the plaintiff's efforts were the procuring cause, and that he was entitled to his commission.
The same result was reached in a very similar case in Nebraska. A
employed broker B to sell his farm. B advertised the property in a newspaper. Farmer C saw the advertisement and told 'his neighbor D that A's
farm was for sale. D went to A and bought the farm. Held, that B was
entitled to his commissions. Anderson v. Cox, 16 Neb. xo.
So in Green v. Bartlett, 14 C. B. (N. S.) 681, an auctioneer and broker
had been employed to sell an estate. Having advertised it and made an
unsuccessful effort to sell it by auction, he was asked by a person who had
attended the sale who the owner was, and he directed him to the principal.
Ultimately this person purchased the estate of the principal, without any
further intervention of the broker, but the court held that he was the procuring cause of the sale and entitled to his commission.
In Ratts v. Shepherd, 37 Kan. 2o, 14 Pac. 496, the broker advertised the
property (a farm) in a newspaper, called it to the attention of the purchaser, offered to take him to see it, gave him a copy of the paper containing
the advertisement, and -directed him to the house of the owner. The purchaser
bought of the owner for less than the sum named by the broker, but it was held
that the broker had produced the purchaser.In Carter v. Webster, 79 Ill. 435, the plaintiff broker, being employed to
find a purchaser and acting in pursuance of a local custom among brokers,
applied to another broker, and the latter to a third, who sent a buyer to the
owner. Held, that plaintiff had earned his commission.
So in Mansell v. Clements, L. R. 9 C. P. 139, 8 Eng. Rep. 449, defendant
had placed a house in plaintiffs' hands to sell. A was looking for a house in
that neighborhood, and seeing a notice (not posted by nor referring to the
plaintiffs) that this house was for sale, made some inquiries about it, but
concluded that the house was too large. He afterwards called upon plaintiffs to see what houses they had, and received from them cards of admission
and terms for several houses, among which was the one in question. He
examined the house and finally purchased it through another agent of the
defendant for a less sum than that named, the plaintiff having nothing to do
with the whole transaction other than giving A the card and terms. A
stated upon the trial that he thought he should not have purchased the house
if he had not received from plaintiffs the card and terms. Held, that there
was evidence from which the jury might find that plaintiffs brought about
the sale.
In Benedict v. Dakin, 243 Ill. 384, 90 N. E. 712, where the property to be
sold was owned by a corporation, it was held that finding a purchaser who
would buy all the stock of the corporation was a sufficient compliance.
In Willard v. Wright, 203 Mass. 406, 89 N. E. 559, the plaintiff had been
employed to sell defendant's business, a combined trucking and ice business.
Plaintiff heard from C, who was doing other business with plaintiff, that C
knew two men who might buy this kind of business, and C, at plaintiff's
request, promised to speak to them. C, at a second request, actually did
speak to the wife of one of them; she spoke to her husband, and her husband
looked into the matter. He obtained another man who had first been interested in defendant's business through a broker, not the plaintiff, but had
abandoned all negotiations and given up being able to buy. The husband
started for defendant's office; on the way he was met by plaintiff and by
plaintiff he was actually introduced to defendant. As a result of negotia-
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tions with the defendant directly the two men bought out the business, and
the plaintiff in this suit for his commission was held the procuring cause of
the sale.
Compare Johnson vz. Seidell, 15o Pa. 396, 24 Atl. 687, where the plaintiff
broker worked upon one P and secured him to look at the property. P
finally decided not to buy himself, but upon P's advice P's brother J bought
directly of the owner. The plaintiff was held not the procuring cause of the
sale to J and the court was upheld in directing a verdict for the defendant.
But the law regards only proximate, and not remote, causes; hence, if,
after the broker's services have failed to accomplish a sale, and after the
proposed purchaser has decided not to buy, other persons induce him to do so,
the broker is not entitled to commissions. Earp v. Cuimmins, 54 Pa. St: 394,
93 Am. Dec. 718.
In Gleason v. Nelson, 162 Mass. 245, 38 N. E. 497, it was said: "The
general rule of law applicable to a case like this is, that, where there has
been no direct communication between the broker and the purchaser, it must
be shown affirmatively that the latter was induced to enter into the negotiations which resulted in the purchase through the means employed by the
broker for that purpose. If the broker employed other persons to aid him,
whether under pay or not, or if he put up maps, signs, notices, .9r otherwise
advertised the property, by means of which a person was induced to open
negotiations with the owner which resulted in his buying the property, the
sale may be said to have been effected through the broker's instrumentality,
But it must be made to appear that what the broker did was the immediate
and efficient cause of such negotiations. If the broker merely talked about
the property with different persons, and one of them, on his own accord, and
not acting in behalf of the broker, mentioned to another that the property
was for sale, and such last mentioned person thereupon looked into the
matter and finally became the purchaser, the agency of the broker in inducing
the sale was not sufficiently direct to entitle him to a commission."
In Witherbee v. Walker, 42 Colo. 1, 93 Pac. 1118, it was pointed out that
where the buyer refused to deal with a broker, that broker cannot be said
to be a procuring cause.
In Hollyday v. Southern Agency, ioo Md. 294, 59 Atl. 646, a broker had
attempted to sell certain land to H, but failed to induce him to pay the
price. Several months later A bought the land and immediately resold most
of it to H. A testified that when he bought he had no arrangement with H
that the latter should buy it. Held, that the broker was not entitled to a
commission as for a sale to A or H.
In Waters v. Rafalsky, 134 App. Div. (N. Y.) 870, 119 N. Y. S. 27r,
a broker had called the attention of T to the property, had given him the
price and terms of sale and told him what rent the property yielded. He
did nothing more than this, but T went to the owner and negotiated a sale
of property with the owner, Who had employed the broker to sell the property, but did not know that there had been any relation between the broker
and T until after the contract was complete. The court held that there
was not evidence to go to a jury from which it could find that plaintiff
broker was the procuring cause of the sale.
In Meyer v. Improved Property Holding 'Co., 137 App. Div. (N. Y.)
691, 122 N. Y. Suppl. 296, the plaintiff broker had been given, at his request,
information concerning rentals of stores in defendants building, that he
might perhaps interest one Seleznick in leasing one of them. He secured an
offer from Seleznick which defendant would not accept. Later Seleznick
of himself made another offer to defendant directly. That offer was not
accepted, but as a result of the negotiations Seleznick" formed a syndicate
and was active in securing leases to syndicat6 of all of stores in building,
and then he himself took one of them under syndicate upon terms practically those of his last offer. The upper court reversed a judgment for the
plaintiff broker because the lower court had refused to instruct the jury:
"If plaintiff introduced Mr. Seleznick to defendant as a prospective tenant
for one store, and Mr. Seleznick afterwards applied to defendant, either on
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his own behalf or for himself and others, for a lease for a number of
stores, this would not give the plaintiff any claim for commissions," and
because this subsequent lease was not in accordance with Seleznick's "original intention, or of the same nature, or in consummation of the original
negotiations."
In Stone v. Ferry, 144 Ill. App. 191, two brokers had been employed by
the owner of land to effect an exchange. The salesman of the plaintiff real estate
firm had dealt with one of three joint owners of other land to be exchanged,
had interested him in the property of the defendant, taken him to it and
given him information and facts about it, that he might communicate with
his two co-owners. The other real estate firm in the meanwhile went to
work upon the same man, but it got another one of the joint owners, and
took the two men to see defendant's land, and gave them information and
sent data to the third joint owner. Then the contract of exchange was
made apparently directly between the two sets of owners. The Appellate
Court reversed a judgment allowing the plaintiff a commission, and said
that there was nothing in the evidence to show that plaintiff was the cause
of the interest of more than one of the joint owners with whom trade was
made; to cause the trade it was necessary to get all of these joint owners.
In Goff v. Hurst, 135 Ky. 276, 122 S. W. 148, a real estate broker authorized to sell defendant's land approached a man who had already had negotiations with the defendant, spoke to him of the land, told him of the agency,
and of the terms and price demanded for sale, and asked him to take the
matter up with the owner. This man did go on with the owner and 'made
the deal with the owner. The court reversed a judgment allowing the broker
a commission, and said that the lower court should have charged peremptorily
for defendant, that plaintiff had given the purchaser no information which
he did not already possess except the fact of the existence of the agency, and
had done nothing to secure the purchaser.
In Auerbach v. Internationale Wolfram Lampen Aktien Gesellschaft, 177
Fed. 458, an agent had been employed to sell foreign interests belonging to
defendant and its grantors in American patents. This agent, plaintiff in this
case, had suggested a purchaser in America, had conducted considerable negotiation, and had induced the American company to send abroad two representatives to confer with the people in Europe. These negotiations, however,
failed, and then plaintiff suggested a scheme of consolidation of defendant's
interests with other interests, such that they might force the American company to terms. While plaintiff was so working upon proposed consolidation
the defendants themselves, and directly with the American company, opened
and soon completed fresh negotiations. The contract with plaintiff had provided that he should have his commission "if they utilized his services or
assistance at the sale or in the proceeding leading up to the sale." But the
court held for the defendant upon the ground that although the purchaser
may have been first interested by the plaintiff's efforts, and although probably the final sale would never have occurred but for plaintiff's efforts in the
first negotiations, still, when the final sale did occur, it was the result of
independent negotiation in which the plaintiff had no share and was of no
assistance.
In Karr v. Brooks, Tex. Civ. App. - , 129 S. W. i6o, a broker
authorized to sell defendant's land had interested one S in buying it. S in
casual conversation told his neighbor N of the land that he was considering, and the result of the conversation between S and N was that N was
to look at defendant's land and if he liked it and could get it he would, and
S would buy N's place. N looked at the land, liked it, and got defendant's
agreement to sell it to him if S did not take it. N refused to deal with plaintiff and said that he would deal directly with owner if at all. He did do so,
although up to the time the sale was closed the owner supposed that N wa5
sent by plaintiff. When defendant learned that N and the plaintiff had not
dealt with each other he refused to pay any commission. The upper court
reversed a judgment for plaintiff on the reasoning that no exertion of plaintiff's caused N to buy, that it was his own volition which made N wish to
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buy as soon as he heard by chance and not through plaintiff's efforts that
the land was for sale.
In Bidwell v. Haas, 121 N. Y. Suppl. 211, the Supreme Court, Appellate
Term, reversed a judgment of a municipal court which had allowed the
plaintiff a commission. There was dispute as to plaintiff's employment, but
the upper court assumed that the plaintiff had been employed, but thought
that there was no showing that he was the procuring cause, when the evidence showed that he had suggested to defendant owner that one Newberger
would be likely to buy, and that defendant should see him, and had then
called upon Newberger and told him that defendant was owner, to which
Newberger said that he would talk with the owner, and as result of the
meeting of Newberger and the defendant a sale to Newberger was made.
It was thought that plaintiff had not secured a purchaser, but had merely
advised defendant where he might find one.
In Winthrop Land Co. v. Utley, Iowa - , 125 N. W. 164, the
defendant had had some talk with Blanchard, who finally bought the land
before he employed plaintiff to sell. The evidence showed that when plaintiff was talking to Blanchard about another farm he spoke to Blanchard of
defendant's place and urged him to buy it, but Blanchard said that he had
already known all about that place and refused to look at it. The plaintiff
was not allowed to put in evidence that he had advertised the land, because
there was no further evidence offered to show that Blanchard had seen or
knew anything of the advertisement. The lower court left it to the jury to
determine whether the plaintiff had placed defendant and Blanchard in communication with reference to sale of defendant's farm and the upper court
affirmed the judgment based upon verdict for the defendant.
In Moore v. Brenninger, 134 App. D. C. 86, the defendant had employed
plaintiff to sell his house and plaintiff approached one Sheppard. A neighbor
had already called Sheppard's attention to house and defendant's attention
to Sheppard, and the neighbor had been asked by defendant to urge Sheppard to buy. When plaintiff approached Sheppard, Sheppard talked trading
and plaintiff thereupon undertook to get defendant's acquiescence in a trade.
This he failed to do, and returned to Sheppard a deposit which Sheppard had
made, and there is no evidence to show any further activity by plaintiff
toward getting Sheppard. Sheppard, however, did finally buy for cash of
defendant, who did not know who was the man who had proposed trade.
The upper court, in affirming 1he judgment of the trial court, held, that the
evidence was such as to justify jury in finding that plaintiff had not been the
procuring cause of the sale, and, therefore, for the defendant.
In Chaffee v. Widnan, Colo. - , io8 Pac. 995, the defendants had
made a contract whereby they were to pay plaintiffs a commission "if the
parties of the second part (the plaintiffs) procure a purchaser for the ranch
who shall on or before March I, 19o4, pay or secure to parties of the first
part (defendants) the sum of $16,ooo." On the same day defendants made a
contract of sale with a purchaser procured by plaintiffs, under which the
final security for purchase price of $i6,ooo was to be given to defendants on
March I,i9o4. This contract was never completed and the security was
never given, but in the meanwhile another agent had interested another nran.
This man carried back a new and better offer from defendants and urged it
upon the man who had failed as first purchaser. As a result of the second
offer another man still was interested, and be joined with the purchaser
who had failed under first contract and they bought the land on March 18
from the defendants. These last negotiations were without participation
by the plaintiff. The plaintiff declared upon his contract and the upper
court affirmed a judgment for defendant upon the double ground that he
had failed to show that he had procured the purchaser to give security by
March i and that he had failed to show that he had procured the contract
which was really worked upon and carried through.

HeinOnline -- 6 Ill. L. R. 161 1911-1912

